Insurgencies are usually won or lost less by battlefield tactics than by political legitimacy. Once a population comes to see the dominant power as foreign (or foreign-backed), the occupier’s position becomes structurally fragile.
That’s the central idea of William R. Polk’s 2007 book Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla War, from the American Revolution to Iraq. Polk argues (across 11 case studies, which I summarized below) that insurgencies follow recurring social and political patterns, and that “hearts and minds” is ultimately a legitimacy contest that outsiders rarely can win on durable terms. Polk (1929-2020) was a long-established political scientist, foreign policy analyst and former Dept. of State official.
It is common in history for guerrilla movements to succeed enough that some leader thinks it’s time to go more traditional in their war. But this is missing the lesson altogether: Conventional war is for defense but offense benefits from guerrilla. Below I share my notes for future reference.
My notes:
- Robert Taber’s 1965 book The War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practise: “ when we speak of the guerrilla fighter, we are speaking of the political partisan, an armed civilian whose principal weapon is not his rifle or machete, but his relationship to the community, the nation, in and for which he fights… it is his camouflage.”
- guerilla fighting is always in opposition to outsiders
- “Like many observers, I hoped that Vietnam would be the final lesson for Americans, that no matter how many soldiers and civilians were killed, how much money was spent, how powerful and sophisticated were the arms employed, foreigners cannot entirely defeat a determined insurgency, except by virtual genocide.”
- The Spanish term “genocide” was brought into English in 1809 (though tactics against Native Americans already employed them)
- When guerillas are too small in number, they first fight as terrorists; later they become an insurgency and finally to meet the enemy on its own terms
- General Charles Lee criticized George Washington for wanting to create a British style army, knowing it would fail
- Kenyan proverb: a flea can trouble a lion more easily than a lion can trouble a flea
- British soldiers dominated Europe, with open farmland and dense supplies to steal: but North America was wooded and sparsely populated. Their 50-pound packs contrasted with 12-pound French, and Indians with nothing
- Indians learned guerilla tactics from early English colonists who were forced into it (shooting from behind trees as they were outnumbered and hungry
- British General Braddock in 1755 was beaten by French and Indians smaller in number and with worse equipment — Braddock hadn’t understood the trends and this became a case study for the colonists (though Washington always wanted a British style military)
- John Hancock (1737–1793) was a prominent Boston merchant who frequently defied British Trade Laws (Navigation Acts) by smuggling goods to avoid taxes (500 indictments). British officials targeted him, seizing his ship the Liberty in 1768 for allegedly smuggling Madeira wine, resulting in intense, popular protests. John Adams defended Hancock against these charges, arguing the taxes were unconstitutional and that the crackdown was tyranny. Adams said the British converted Hancock into a patriot
- Philadelphia Patriotic Society was one of many 1750s and 1760s “terrorist” groups, author notes. (Correction: The Patriotic Society of the City and County of Philadelphia was established by German residents in 1772, not the 1750s or 1760s. Its stated purpose was to prepare and support the “inevitable struggle” against the British)
- The “local logic” of various unrelated groups of insurgents began the American Revolution and input in Vietnam, Ireland, Yugoslavia and Kenya
- Mao Ze Dong: it is population not land that determines an insurgency’s success (winning the “sea” of people)
- John Pancake : “The real prize of the American Revolution was the allegiance of a majority of the people”
- Feb 27, 1776 Moore’s Creek Bridge: farmers not organized by disrupted British loyalists (local logic)
- During the American Revolution, local Committees of Safety functioned as shadow governments, systematically purging and suppressing Loyalists to secure Patriot control. These committees investigated, disarmed, fined, and imprisoned those deemed “unfriendly” to the American cause, often seizing property and forcing loyalty oaths.
- “Everywhere insurgents spend more energy attacking their fellow inhabitants than the foreign enemy. They do so in part, no doubt, because civilians are easier targets than soldiers, but this is not the crucial reason: it is that unless they can forge a solid core of like-minded people, they cannot hope to survive, much less to win.”
- Battle of Sullivan’s Island (Charleston in June 1776), where Charles Lee received substantial credit for a victory that many at the time felt was actually orchestrated by local commanders, while George Washington was facing a string of defeats in New York.
- Robert Washington: The colonial militia had “counterfeit discipline” and couldn’t beat the English. Yet once the guerilla tactics worked, at Valley Forge Washington got support to again revert to an English style army — only French support helped win.
- It is common in history for guerrilla movements to succeed enough that some leader thinks it’s time to go more traditional in their war. But this is missing the lesson altogether. Conventional war is for defense but offense benefits from guerrilla
- The “heart of insurgency” is anti-foreign (xenophobic in the literal sense), with collaborationist/local ally regimes losing legitimacy as insurgents claim the mantle of “the nation.”
- His phased model of how insurgencies grow (from early “terror”-style actions toward broader guerrilla conflict and parallel governance), emphasizing the political contest more than tactics.
- Author argues the “new” counterinsurgency doctrine isn’t new, and that its key requirement—getting the population to accept governance as legitimate—is especially unlikely for foreigners.
- He emphasizes the staggering cost side of the ledger (lives, long-term injuries, financial cost), warning that “more troops” often means more targets, not victory.
- He frames “the long war” risk as strategically corrosive (blowback, reputational damage, domestic strain) and points to how a sprawling posture can incentivize adversaries to adopt guerrilla/terror tactics.
- His basic withdrawal logic: staying the course doesn’t fix legitimacy; precipitate withdrawal risks chaos; orderly withdrawal paired with constructive steps is the least bad option.